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Abstract—We introduce the Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR)
model that captures the propagation of route updates under ar-
bitrary changes in topology or path preferences. DPR introduces
the notion of causation chains where the route flap at one node
causes a flap at the next node along the chain.
Using DPR, we model the Gao-Rexford (economic) guidelines
that guarantee the safety (i.e., convergence) of policy routing. We
establish three principles of safe policy routing dynamics. The
non-interference principle provides insight into which ASes can
directly induce route changes in one another. The single cycle
principle and the multi-tiered cycle principle provide insight into
how cycles of routing updates can manifest in any network.
We develop INTERFERENCEBEAT, a distributed algorithm that
propagates a small token along causation chains to check adher-
ence to these principles. To enhance the diagnosis power of IN-
TERFERENCEBEAT, we model four violations of the Gao-Rexford
guidelines (e.g., transiting between peers) and characterize the
resulting dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is currently the de-
facto inter-domain routing protocol employed in the Internet.
BGP allows Autonomous Systems (ASes), operated by differ-
ent administrative domains (e.g., Internet Service Providers,
companies, universities) to independently apply local poli-
cies for selecting routes and propagating routing information.
Given the critical role and global scope of BGP, both its tran-
sient and steady-state performance have received significant
attention, and problems related to delayed convergence [1] and
potential instability [2], [3] (i.e., route oscillations/flaps) have
been identified and studied.
Route flaps in particular can be highly disruptive given the
associated cost of communication and processing overheads.
Route flaps can be transient (i.e., short-term) due to temporary
changes in topology or route/path preferences. Route flaps can
also be persistent due to conflicting routing policies across
ASes (i.e., policies can not be simultaneously satisfied) [4].
Economic constraints that are typical of commercial rela-
tionships between ASes in the Internet—henceforth referred to
as the Gao-Rexford guidelines [5]—have been shown to make
BGP free from policy conflicts (i.e., convergent). We refer
to routing policy instances that adhere to the Gao-Rexford
guidelines as safe and ones that do not as potentially unsafe.
The Gao-Rexford guidelines are:
1) An AS classifies its neighboring ASes as either cus-
tomer, peer or provider.
2) The path preferences are restricted in a hierarchical
fashion. Every AS prefers a path through a customer
AS over a path through a peer/provider AS.
3) All advertised paths are “valley-free”. They consist of
zero or more customer-to-provider links followed by an
optional peering link followed by zero or more provider-
to-customer links.
Our Contribution:
We extend the Stable Paths Problem [4] (a static model of
BGP) to capture the propagation dynamics of route updates
under arbitrary changes in topology (e.g., link failures) or path
preferences (e.g., policy configuration updates). We call this
extended model the Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR) model.
DPR introduces the notion of causation chains where the route
flap at one node causes a flap at the next node along the chain.
We model a strict version of the Gao-Rexford guidelines
which we call the economic DPR model. We prove the
existence of several invariant properties of causation chains
irrespective of arbitrary changes in topology or path prefer-
ences. For example, we prove that all causation chains in the
economic DPR model are valley-free, thus generalizing the
result in [6] to dynamic networks. Violations of the economic
DPR model result in potentially unsafe routing behavior where
the causation chains are not necessarily valley-free.
We develop INTERFERENCEBEAT, a distributed algorithm
that checks if the routing dynamics adhere to the ones pre-
dicted by the economic DPR model. If not, then the presence
of policy violations can be inferred. INTERFERENCEBEAT
appends a token to each routing update message. Tokens are
propagated along causation chains.
We model four common policy violations (e.g., transiting
between peers). For each violation, we prove the invariant
properties of the resulting causation chains. Using these in-
ferred properties, we extend the diagnosis power of INTER-
FERENCEBEAT. The novelty of this work is that:
1) We identify key principles (i.e., invariant properties) of
safe policy routing dynamics regardless of changes to
the underlying topology or path preferences.
2) We identify and model four common violations of safe
policy routing and characterize the resulting dynamics.
3) We introduce INTERFERENCEBEAT, a distributed algo-
rithm to detect and diagnose policy violations.
2II. PRINCIPLES OF SAFE POLICY ROUTING DYNAMICS
In this section, we distill the key results of our DPR
model into three principles. These principles capture invariant
properties of the routing dynamics under safe policy routing
(i.e., where the policies of all nodes adhere to the Gao-
Rexford guidelines). We discuss reasons why ASes violate
these guidelines. Such policy violations result in potentially
unsafe routing dynamics where our principles no longer hold.
We also show that routing dynamics need to be explicitly
considered when detecting policy violations. We postpone for-
mal definitions to later sections and focus here on presenting
the main intuitions behind our results.
A. What are the principles?
Non-Interference Principle: If an AS y is not at a higher
tier-level than (provider to) any two of its neighbors x and
z, then x and z cannot directly induce path changes in each
other through y. This principle holds regardless of changes in
the underlying topology or path preferences.
The notion of “inducing path changes” is synonymous
with a continuous propagation of path changes across nodes,
which we model in DPR as a causation chain. The basic
premise of the non-interference principle comes from a result
in DPR (Theorem 1 in Section IV) where we proved that any
causation chain must not contain sequences such as a provider-
to-customer-to-provider.
Figure 1 outlines all the Internet configurations where AS x
cannot directly affect AS z through AS y. More specifically,
non-interference holds if:
1) AS y is multi-homed with providers AS x and AS z.
2) AS y is a customer of AS x and a peer of AS z.
3) AS y is a peer of AS x and a customer of AS z.
4) AS y is a peer of both AS x and AS z
Fig. 1. All Internet configurations where AS x cannot directly affect AS
z. Horizontal edges represent peering links and diagonal edges represent
customer-to-provider links.
Single Cycle Principle: In any cycle of routing update
messages between ASes, every AS x affects its neighbor y at
most once. This principle holds regardless of changes in the
underlying topology or path preferences.
The notion of “cycle” is synonymous with a continuous
propagation of path changes across nodes where at least one
node is affected twice. We model such a cycle of path changes
in DPR as a causation cycle. The single cycle principle comes
from a result in DPR (Theorem 2 in Section IV) where we
proved that any causation cycle in safe policy routing occurs
only once.
Multi-Tiered Cycle Principle: Every cycle of routing update
messages between ASes must have at least two ASes in
different tier-levels. This principle holds regardless of changes
in the underlying topology or path preferences.
The multi-tiered cycle principle comes from a result in DPR
(Theorem 2 in Section IV) where we proved that no causation
cycle in safe policy routing can occur exclusively between
peering ASes.
B. Why do the principles not always hold?
Violations of safe policy routing (i.e., the Gao-Rexford
guidelines) result in unpredictable, black-box dynamics that
are potentially unsafe. When policy violations occur, the
principles no longer hold (Table III in Section VI). The reasons
for such violations are:
1) Intentional: representing legitimate policy configura-
tions for backup links or complex agreements [7].
2) Unintentional: representing misconfigurations or com-
plex real-time interactions between routers that do not
reflect the intentions of the administrators.
C. How do we check the principles?
Network administrators can statically check whether they
are conforming to the Gao-Rexford guidelines where the
dynamics are guaranteed to conform to the principles. This
can be done by inspecting their local preferences and ensuring
that all adopted paths are valley-free.
Static checks are inadequate since not all nodes are nec-
essarily compliant with the guidelines. Figure 2 illustrates
“interference” between nodes 1 and 3. The interference is
due to policy violations by node 2 which cannot be statically
checked by node 3. Instead, node 3 will need to discover
the interference by somehow detecting the causation chain
propagating through nodes 1, 2 and 3.
Fig. 2. Sample dynamics where interference occurs. The list of path
preferences for nodes 2 and 3 are organized such that the most preferred
path is at the top. Paths not explicitly listed are forbidden. All nodes are
trying to reach destination node 0.
Node 3 is abiding by the Gao-Rexford guidelines and
initially uses the customer path h30i which is valley-free. Node
2, however, violates the guidelines by preferring a path through
its provider h210i over a path through its customer h20i. At
time t, the link connecting node 1 to node 0 is lost, causing
node 1 to have an empty path to node 0 at time t+1. At time
t + 2, node 2 switches from path h210i to h20i. This action
in turn causes node 3 to switch from path h30i to h320i at
3time t + 3. Even though node 3 abides by the Gao-Rexford
guidelines, the forbidden interference occurs. The causation
chain consists of a provider (node 1), followed by its customer
(node 2), followed by another provider (node 3).
If node 2 does not violate the guidelines, the dynamics
would manifest differently. Suppose the path h20i is forbidden,
forcing node 2 to use its provider path h210i. The loss of link
connectivity between nodes 1 and 0 at time t causes node 2
to lose connectivity at time t + 2. Node 3 is unaffected. The
causation chain solely consists of a provider (node 1) followed
by its customer (node 2). Since this chain is valley-free, the
dynamics conform to the principles.
III. DYNAMIC POLICY ROUTING MODEL
The Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR) model is used to
capture the dynamics of BGP. Each AS is represented by a
node in a graph. AS path preferences are represented by a
ranking relation. DPR extends the notion of SPP [4] to model
time-varying topologies and path preferences.
A. Basics of DPR
Definition 1 (Time). Time is represented by a non-negative,
discrete index t such that: t 2 [0,1).
Definition 2 (Network). The network is represented by a graph
G = (V,E):
• Each vertex u 2 V represents an AS.
• Each edge in E is time dependent: (u, v)t 2 E if
u is connected to v at time t. Conversely, a lack of
connectivity between u and v at time t (i.e., link failure)
is represented by (u, v)t /2 E.
There exists a distinguished destination node, represented as
root, where root 2 V .
Definition 3 (Paths). Paths are sequences of nodes of the form:
hu1 u2 . . . uki. The empty path is denoted by hi. All paths
end with the root node. A concatenation of a node u with a
path Q is represented as: P = hu Qi. A path originating from
u is represented by Pu. The set of paths originating from u
is represented by Pu.
Definition 4 (Path Preferences). At each time t, each node
u has a unique preference over paths originating at u. This
dynamic ranking is represented by the ∫t operator. If u prefers
Pu over Qu at time t then: Pu ∫t Qu. If u prefers Pu over
Qu for all t then: Pu ∫ Qu. Strict preference is defined by:
Pu ¬t Qu iff Pu ∫t Qu and Qu 6∫t Pu
For all times t, for each node u 2 V , ∫t is a total order over
Pu [ hi. Thus each node u has an ordered preference over all
its paths to root. If two paths start with different nodes, then
they have no preference relation. Forbidden paths P are those
ranked below the empty path for all times: hi ¬ P . All paths
with repeating nodes are forbidden.
Definition 5 (DPR Instance). A Dynamic Policy Routing
(DPR) instance consists of a graph and a path preference
D = (∫t, G).
Definition 6 (Best Paths). At each time index t, every node
u has a path to root, represented by Pu = º(u, t). The
available path choices of a node, via all possible neighbors
v, are represented by Choices(u, t) where:
Choices(u, t) = hi [ {hu º(v, t)i; (u, v)t 2 E}
The Best(u, t) notation represents the current best path for u:
Best(u, t) = max
∫t
Choices(u, t)
The paths assigned to nodes at each time t is their best path
of the previous round. For all nodes u 2 V :
• º(u, 0) = hi
• º(u, t) = Best(u, t° 1)
The path used by node u at time t, º(u, t), was its best path
at time t ° 1, Best(u, t ° 1). This best path was determined
using the ranking ∫t°1.
Definition 7 (Next-Hop Neighbor). The Ω notation is used to
represent the next-hop neighbor of a current path:
Ω(u, t) = NextHop(º(u, t))
Definition 8 (Realized Paths). A path Pu is realized iff there
exists a time t such that º(u, t) = Pu.
Proposition 1 (Path Deconstruction). If Ω(u0, t) = u1 then
º(u0, t) = hu0 º(u1, t° 1)i
Proof: By the definition of º, º(u0, t) = Best(u0, t°1) so
º(u0, t) 2 Choices(u0, t°1). So by the definition of Choices,
º(u0, t) = hu0 º(u1, t° 1)i, where u1 = Ω(u0, t).
B. Causation in DPR
Definition 9 (Path Rank Changes). The following definitions
describe the relative change in the rankings of selected paths
for a node:
RankDec(u, t) iÆ º(u, t) ¬t º(u, t+ 1)
RankInc(u, t) iÆ º(u, t) ¡t º(u, t+ 1)
RankSame(u, t) iÆ º(u, t) = º(u, t+ 1)
The relative change in rankings are with respect to the current
path ranking ∫t.
Definition 10 (Causation Function). In DPR, a node u may
change its current path at a given time t. The causation
function represents u’s neighboring node v responsible for u’s
path change. Causation function is the base construct from
which causation chains will be built. A causation function C
maps each node u at a given time t to a neighboring node v:
C(u, t) = v.
The operating conditions for the causation function are
outlined in Table I. There are three cases for the causation
function C(u, t) = v:
1) Node v was the next hop of u’s chosen path at time t.
However, node v changed its path at time t, causing u
to choose a less preferred path at time t+ 1.
2) Node v advertised a new path at time t, causing u to
choose a more preferred path through v at time t+ 1.
4TABLE I
CAUSATION FUNCTION
Condition 1: RankDec(u, t) ) C(u, t) = Ω(u, t)
Condition 2: RankInc(u, t) ) C(u, t) = Ω(u, t+ 1)
Condition 3: RankSame(u, t) ) C(u, t) is empty
3) v is empty, because u’s path did not change between
times t and t+ 1.
Definition 11 (Causation Chain). A causation chain is a
sequence of nodes where each node yi°1 causes yi to change
its current path. It is represented by Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit,
where:
C(yi, t+ i) = yi°1 for all 0 < i ∑ k
Time t is defined with respect to y0, and it takes i time steps
to build the causation chain up to node yi. An example of a
causation chain can be seen in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Causation chain Y = hy0 y1 y2it. A link failure between y0 and root
occurred at time t, causing y0 to have no path to root at time t+1. This causes
y1 to switch to a less preferred path at time t+2, where C(y1, t+1) = y0
with causation condition 1. This causes y2 to switch to a more preferred path
via y1 at time t+ 3, where C(y2, t+ 2) = y1 with causation condition 2.
Definition 12 (Causation Cycle). A causation cycle is a
causation chain with a repeated node: Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit,
where y0 = yk. The primary node of the causation cycle is
y0 = yk.
Definition 13 (Simple Causation Cycle). A causation cycle Y
is simple if:
C(y1, t+ k + 1) 6= y0
The following examples represent simple and non-simple
causation cycles:
Simple: hy0 y1 y2 y0 y3it
Non-Simple: hy0 y1 y2 y0 y1it
IV. ECONOMIC DPR MODEL
This section will show that if a DPR instance conforms to
a strict version of the Gao-Rexford guidelines [5], then its
dynamic behavior can be characterized, regardless of changes
in topology or path preferences. In particular, we show that
all causation chains have the property known as “valley-free”
and all causation cycles are simple. The economic constraints
we consider are as follows:
1) Every node is customer, peer, or provider to its neigh-
boring nodes.
2) A node cannot be a provider to itself. There are no
customer-provider cycles. Furthermore, a node cannot
be both a (direct or indirect) provider and a (direct or
indirect) peer to another node.
3) For all times, each node prefers a path through a
customer over a path through a peer/provider and prefers
a path through a peer over a path through a provider.
4) Each node provides transit service only to its customers.
Thus, all paths are valley-free.
These economic constraints are a stricter version of the Gao-
Rexford guidelines which are sufficient to guarantee stability
in a static graph. Thus, the economic DPR model is safe. The
restrictions of the economic model enable equivalence classes
of peers, as seen in Figure 4. The economic relationships
between nodes can be represented using a pre-order relation.
Fig. 4. Equivalence classes of peers in economic DPR.
A. Basics of Economic DPR
Definition 14 (Economic Operator). The economic relation-
ship between nodes are described using the operator ∫$. This
operator is essential for reasoning about the economic rela-
tionships between nodes in both paths and causation chains.
A strict economic relation is defined by:
u ¬$ v iff u ∫$ v and u  $ v
and an equivalence relation is defined by:
u =$ v iff u ∫$ v and u π$ v
Economic relationships can be derived from the operator ∫$:
• If u is a customer of v then u ¡$ v.
• If u is a provider to v then u ¬$ v.
• If u is a peer to v then u =$ v.
The properties of the economic operator ∫$ can be modelled
using pre-order conditions:
1) (reflexive) x ∫$ x
2) (transitive) x ∫$ y and y ∫$ z implies x ∫$ z
The following transitive relationships hold:
x ¬$ y and y ∫$ z implies x ¬$ z
x ∫$ y and y ¬$ z implies x ¬$ z
Definition 15 (Customer, Peer, and Provider Paths). We define
paths by the economic relationship between a path’s starting
node u and its next-hop. For all paths Pu:
Customer(Pu) iff u ¬$ NextHop(Pu)
Peer(Pu) iff u =$ NextHop(Pu)
Provider(Pu) iff u ¡$ NextHop(Pu)
5Definition 16 (Valley). We define a valley to be a sequence
of three nodes ha b ci satisfying the condition:
a ∫$ b π$ c
The four types of valleys can be seen in Figure 5. Every
valley-free sequence is a series of zero or more ascending
customer-to-provider relationships, followed by an optional
peer relationship, followed by a series of zero or more de-
scending provider-to-customer relationships.
Fig. 5. Valleys
Definition 17 (Economic DPR Instances). An economic DPR
instance (∫$,∫t, G) satisfies the following conditions:
1) All paths which have a valley are forbidden.
HasValley(P )) hi ¬ P
2) Customer paths are always preferred over peer/provider
paths and peer paths are always preferred over provider
paths. Thus given paths Pu1 and Pu2 :
Customer(Pu1 ) and not Customer(Pu2 ) ) Pu1 ¬ Pu2
Peer(Pu1 ) and Provider(Pu2 ) ) Pu1 ¬ Pu2
B. Causation in Economic DPR
This section characterizes causation chains and cycles for
economic DPR instances.
root
t
y0
root
t+1
root
t+2
root
t+3
root
t+4
y1 y2 y1 y2 y1 y2 y1 y2 y1 y2
y0 y0 y0 y0
Fig. 6. Causation cycle Y = hy0 y1 y2 y0it. A link failure between
y0 and root occurred at time t, causing y0 to have no path to root at time
t+ 1. This causes y1 to switch to a less preferred path at time t+ 2, where
C(y1, t + 1) = y0 with causation condition 1. This causes y2 to switch to
a path through y1 at time t + 3, where C(y2, t + 2) = y1 with causation
condition 2. The cycle is closed with y0 switching to a path via y2 at time
t+4, where C(y0, t+3) = y2 with causation condition 2. Note the existence
of a separate causation chain Y 0 = hy0 y2it.
Theorem 1. Every causation chain of an economic DPR
instance (∫$,∫t, G) is valley-free.
For ease of exposition, the full proof of Theorem 1 is in
Appendix A. In the proof, we assume that there exists a cau-
sation chain that has a valley consisting of three consecutive
nodes ha b cit. First we prove that at no time during the
causation chain did b have a customer path. Then we prove
that at some time during the causation chain, c had a path
through b. Since b is a customer/peer to c and b does not have
a customer path then c had a realized valley path through b,
causing a contradiction.
We introduce the following types of cycles:
Definition 18 (Horizontal Cycle). A causation cycle is hori-
zontal if all adjacent nodes in the cycle are peers.
Definition 19 (Vertical Cycle). A causation cycle is vertical
if there is at least one customer/provider relationship between
adjacent nodes in the cycle.
Figure 6 represents a simple vertical causation cycle, where
node y0 loses a path to root and reroutes through y2.
Lemma 1. Given a causation cycle Y = hy0 . . . ykit of an
economic DPR instance (∫$,∫t, G), every node in Y is a
provider to the primary node y0.
Proof: Let yi 2 Y , where 0 < i < k. By Theorem 1,
Y is valley-free and either yi°1 π$ yi or yi ∫$ yi+1. If the
first case is true, then by the definition of valley-free paths
yj°1 ¡$ yj for all 0 < j < i, and by the transitive nature
of economic relationships, y0 ¡$ yi. If the second case is
true, then by the definition of valley-free paths yj ¬$ yj+1
for all i < j < k, and by the transitive nature of economic
relationships, yi ¬$ yk. Thus every node yi is a provider to
y0 = yk.
Theorem 2. Every causation cycle Y = hy0 . . . ykit of an
economic DPR instance is vertical and simple.
Proof: Lemma 1 directly implies that every causation
cycle in economic DPR instances are vertical. The second
part regarding simple causation cycles is proved by contra-
diction. Assume there exists a non-simple causation cycle
Y1 = hy0 y1 . . . yk y1it where y0 = yk. From Lemma 1,
y0 ¡$ y1. However a new causation cycle Y2 exists where:
Y2 = hy1 y2 . . . yk°1 yk y1it+1. Thus by Lemma 1,
y1 ¡$ yk = y0 which is a contradiction.
The theoretical results in this section are the proofs for the
three principles of safe policy routing dynamics introduced
in Section II. The non-interference principle comes from
Theorem 1, which states that every causation chain in an
economic DPR instance must be valley-free. The single and
multi-tiered cycle principles come from Theorem 2, which
states that every causation cycle in an economic DPR instance
is vertical and simple.
V. INTERFERENCEBEAT
In this section, we outline a distributed algorithm, INTER-
FERENCEBEAT, that checks if the principles of safe policy
routing dynamics are maintained or whether policy violations
exist. This is accomplished by detecting forbidden causation
chains (including cycles) induced by policy violations. Once a
forbidden causation chain is detected, the ASes involved need
to collaborate to resolve the potential problem.
A. Description of INTERFERENCEBEAT
INTERFERENCEBEAT piggybacks a small token alongside
route updates. When a node y receives a route update from
its neighbor v at time t, it also receives a token µin. If node y
selects a new path then it broadcasts a new token µout alongside
6its own route update at time t + 1. Tokens are passed along
causation chains. In general, a causation chain is started when
a link flaps (i.e., is lost or becomes available) or when a
node changes its path preferences. A token consists of three
parts, (i, r, n). The identifier of the causation chain is i. The
economic relationship between y and its predecessor v on the
causation chain is r 2 {¬$, ¡$, =$, ;}. For example, if v
is a provider to y, then r is ¬$. The counter n keeps track of
the number of times the token was passed along a customer-
to-provider or a provider-to-customer link.
The PROCESS function, outlined in Figure 7, performs basic
routing tasks and handles the incoming and outgoing tokens.
It is invoked in every node y at time t after receiving all
routing update messages. In steps 2 and 3, node y chooses
and adopts its best available path. If y’s assigned path has
changed in step 4 (i.e., an action occurred), then node y’s
causing neighbor v is identified in step 5. The contents of
the token received from neighbor v are recovered in step 6. In
step 7, the CREATETOKEN function is called which returns the
contents of the new token to be sent out by y at time t+1. The
CHECKPRINCIPLES function is called in step 8. Node y stores
information about the outgoing token in step 9. In step 10, the
outgoing token created by node y is disseminated to all y’s
neighbors.
1: function PROCESS(y, t)
2: Best(y, t)√ max∫t Choices(y, t)
3: º(y, t+ 1)√ Best(y, t)
4: if º(y, t+ 1) 6= º(y, t) then
5: v = C(y, t)
6: µin =GETTOKENFROMNEIGHBOR(y, v, t)
7: µout = CREATETOKEN(y, v, µin)
8: CHECKPRINCIPLES(y, v, µin, µout)
9: STORETOKEN(y, v, µout)
10: SENDTOKEN(y, t, µout)
Fig. 7. PROCESS function.
The CREATETOKEN function is outlined in Figure 8. Step
2 retrieves the needed parts from the incoming token. If the
identifier iin is empty in step 3 then a new one is generated in
step 4. Otherwise, in step 6, the outgoing identifier iout is set to
the incoming identifier iin. In step 7, the economic relationship
between v and y is obtained and stored in rout. In steps 8
through 11, the outgoing counter nout is only incremented if
nodes y and v are not peers. The outgoing token is returned
in step 12.
The CHECKPRINCIPLES function is outlined in Figure 9.
Steps 2 and 3 retrieve the needed parts from the tokens. Step
4 checks for the existence of a valley causation chain. If one
is found, then interference is reported, where the causing node
v, the chain identifier iin and the relationship rin are identified.
In step 6, node y determines if it has previously received a
token with identifier iin. If so, then a cycle is detected. Node
y recovers the old information in step 7. If the token was
previously received from the same neighbor v then a non-
simple cycle is reported in step 9. Step 10 checks if the token
previously received contained the same counter value. If so,
1: function CREATETOKEN(y, v, µin)
2: (iin, , nin) = µin
3: if iin is ; then
4: (iout, rout, nout) =(NEWID(), ;, 0)
5: else
6: iout = iin
7: rout = ECONOMICRELATION(v, y)
8: if rout is equal to =$ then
9: nout = nin
10: else
11: nout = nin + 1
12: return (iout, rout, nout)
Fig. 8. CREATETOKEN function.
then the token was only passed between peers since leaving
node y and a horizontal cycle is reported in step 11.
1: function CHECKPRINCIPLES(y, v, µin, µout)
2: (iin, rin, ) = µin
3: ( , , nout) = µout
4: if (rin is equal to ¬$ or =$) and (v π$ y) then
5: REPORTINTERFERENCE(y, v, µin)
6: if HASRECEIVEDTOKEN(y, iin) then
7: (vold, nold) = GETSTOREDTOKEN(y, iin)
8: if vold is equal to v then
9: REPORTNONSIMPLECYCLE(y, v, µin)
10: if nold is equal to nout then
11: REPORTHORIZONTALCYCLE(y, v, µin)
Fig. 9. CHECKPRINCIPLES function.
B. Sample Operation of INTERFERENCEBEAT
Figure 10 shows the operation of INTERFERENCEBEAT on
the DPR instance described in Figure 3, assuming y0, y1 and
y2 are all peers. At time t+1, node y0 initiates a new causation
chain with identifier ID1 and sends a token to y1. Since y0
initiated the chain, the count is 0 and the relationship is ;.
Node y1 takes an action and sends a new token to y2. Since y1
and y0 are peers, the relationship is set to =$ and the count is
still 0 as the token only traversed a peering link. Finally, since
y2 is a peer to its causing node y1, interference is detected by
y2 upon receiving the token.
Fig. 10. Sample operation of INTERFERENCEBEAT.
C. Properties of INTERFERENCEBEAT
INTERFERENCEBEAT has the following characteristics:
• Efficient Space. A small token of space complexity O(1)
(a few bytes) is appended to each routing update message
7irrespective of how the routing dynamics manifest in the
network.
• Provably Correct. INTERFERENCEBEAT is based on a
comprehensive theory of policy routing dynamics and
hence is provably correct with any dynamic network. In
other words, any changes in network topology or path
preferences do not affect the correctness of detecting
policy violations.
• Adoptable. INTERFERENCEBEAT enables results even in
the case of gradual adoption of the protocol. To detect
policy violations, only the ASes along the causation chain
need to adopt the protocol. Thus neighboring ASes can
use INTERFERENCEBEAT to detect misconfigurations.
• Privacy Preserving. ASes only reveal information to
their immediate neighbors and local policy information
is not explicitly shared.
D. Practical Considerations for INTERFERENCEBEAT
INTERFERENCEBEAT could be implemented over BGP
where the token is passed in the message options. When an AS
initiates a new causation chain it must create a new identifier
using the NEWID() function. This can be accomplished by
hashing the AS number, router identifier, time and destination
prefix. A fixed number of bits can be allocated to the identifier,
with more bits reducing the probability of a hash collision.
In INTERFERENCEBEAT, if a cycle or valley is detected by a
node y, only its causing neighbor node v can be immediately
identified. In order to identify/notify other nodes along the
chain, a back-propagating alert protocol may be used. Each
node can leverage its stored tokens to find its previous causing
neighbor.
In appendix F we show that the synchronicity of DPR is
not a hindrance and that it has sufficient expressive power
to model asynchronicity. Hence, INTERFERENCEBEAT can be
trivially extended to a real-time setting.
VI. VIOLATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC DPR MODEL
We formally define four common policy violations, which
are relaxations of the economic DPR model. For each violation
we prove the invariant properties of the resultant causation
chains and cycles. The modelled dynamics induced by each
violation can be compared against the dynamics observed by
INTERFERENCEBEAT. If a violation cannot cause the observed
behavior, then it can be ruled out.
A. Description of Violations
To describe paths and causation chains in better detail we
categorize valleys into four subtypes.
Definition 20 (Valley Types). We extend definition 16 of
valleys to four subtypes as shown in Table II.
Violation 1: Non-Strict Economic Relationships
With non-strict economic relationships, a node can be both
a (direct or indirect) provider and a (direct or indirect) peer
to another node. Figure 11 shows a comparison between
non-strict and strict economic relationships.
TABLE II
VALLEY TYPES GIVEN SEQUENCE ha b ci.
Valley Type Condition Illustration
A a ¬$ b ¡$ c
B a ¬$ b =$ c
C a =$ b ¡$ c
D a =$ b =$ c
z
u peer
peer
provider
provider
Non-Strict
z
u peer
peer
provider
provider
Strict
Fig. 11. Strict and non-strict economic relationships. In the strict variant,
node u cannot be an indirect provider and peer to node z.
Violation 2: Transiting Between Peers
Generally, an AS only carries traffic that is destined to
(or originating from) one of its customers. However, due
to misconfigurations or complex agreements between peers,
an AS may transit traffic between its peers. Economic DPR
instances with this violation have an enlarged set of realizable
paths. Paths containing valleys of type D can be adopted by
nodes. However, paths are forbidden if they contain valley
types A, B, or C. Therefore, every realizable path consists
of a series of zero or more ascending customer-to-provider
edges, followed by zero or more peer edges, followed by zero
or more descending provider-to-customer edges, as shown in
Figure 12.
With Peer Transiting Without Peer Transiting
Fig. 12. Allowable paths in economic DPR with and without violation 2.
Violation 3: Peer Paths over Customer Paths
Whereas violation 2 is a relaxation on the set of realizable
paths, violation 3 is a relaxation of the path preferences.
Nodes in economic DPR instances with violation 3 can
prefer peer paths over customer paths. Nodes, however,
cannot prefer provider paths over peer/customer paths. Only
valley-free paths are realizable.
Violation 4: Provider Paths over Peer/Customer Paths
Nodes in economic DPR instances with violation 4 can
prefer provider paths over peer/customer paths. Again, only
valley-free paths are realizable.
8TABLE III
VIOLATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC DPR MODEL
Violation Valley Types in Causation Chains: Vertical Cycles Horizontal Cycles Potentially
A B C D Unsafe?
0: None simple none no
1: Non-Strict Economics simple none no
2: Transiting simple non-simple, simple yes
3: Peers Preferred simple non-simple, simple yes
4: Providers Preferred non-simple, simple none yes
B. Dynamics Induced by Violations
The four violations describe different variants of the eco-
nomic DPR model. Each variant results in different types
of causation chains and cycles. For ease of exposition, we
model the resulting dynamics of each violation in isolation.
The theoretical proofs for the violations can be found in the
appendices
Table III summarizes the effects of each violation on the
characteristics of causation chains and cycles. The first and
second rows show the strict and non-strict economic DPR
models. They are the only two variants guaranteed to be
safe. The non-strict economic DPR model, however, when
combined with other violations could lead to potentially unsafe
behavior. The three other violations induce routing behavior
which is potentially unsafe.
INTERFERENCEBEAT can be extended using the results of
Table III. Upon the detection of a valley in the causation
chain, its type (A, B, C, or D) can rule out possible causing
violations. For example, if a valley of type B was detected
using INTERFERENCEBEAT, then violations 1, 2, and 3 can be
immediately ruled out as the possible causes for the observed
behavior. Similar methods can be used upon detection of
causation cycles.
VII. RELATED WORK
Static models for BGP, such as the Stable Paths Problem
(SPP) [4], provide insight into the steady-state behavior of
policy routing. There are also offline methods that leverage
SPP and utilize information from BGP tables [8] to infer policy
conflicts between ASes. DPR extends SPP to give insight into
the real-time transient behavior of networks. DPR allows us
to reason about issues such as misconfigured routing policies
or networks with sporadic link failures.
The canonical solution for detecting policy conflicts based
on SPP is the Safe Path Vector Protocol (SPVP) introduced
by Griffin et al. in [9]. SPVP exchanges route flaps among
ASes in extended “history” messages. INTERFERENCEBEAT
extends SPVP by appending additional information in a small
token to each routing update message to detect violations of
the Gao-Rexford guidelines [5].
There are many algorithms that attempt to detect and resolve
policy conflicts. Counting [10] and other token-based [11]
heuristic approaches benefit from having a low communication
overhead. INTERFERENCEBEAT extends such approaches by
leveraging the DPR model to guarantee the correctness of
policy violation detection and diagnosis.
Finally, there are routing architectures that constrain tradi-
tional policy routing to guarantee convergence. Metarouting
[12] defines a policy language based on a routing algebra
that gives compile-time guarantees for routing convergence.
In [13], real-time enforcement of convergence is achieved
by passing information in tokens to affect policy rankings.
INTERFERENCEBEAT does not enforce convergence. Instead
it leverages the DPR model to detect non-compliance to the
principles of safe routing dynamics and notifies ASes upon
the detection of policy violations.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a Dynamic Policy Routing (DPR) model,
which extends the static model of BGP to capture the prop-
agation dynamics of route flaps due to arbitrary changes in
topology or path preferences. The theoretical results of this
paper can be summarized by three key principles which distill
the properties of routing dynamics in a safe (economic) policy
configuration.
We introduce INTERFERENCEBEAT, a novel distributed
algorithm to detect and diagnose policy violations. INTER-
FERENCEBEAT has a beneficial set of characteristics such
as efficiency, privacy, and adoptability. Diagnosis is further
enhanced by modelling common policy violations such as the
preference of peer paths over customer paths.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
For convenience of notation, we drop the time index of cer-
tain terms with respect to a given chain Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit,
namely:
º(yi) = º(yi, t+ i)
ºnext(yi) = º(yi, t+ i+ 1)
Ω(yi) = Ω(yi, t+ i)
Ωnext(yi) = Ω(yi, t+ i+ 1)
RankDec(yi) iff RankDec(yi, t+ i)
RankSame(yi) iff RankSame(yi, t+ i)
RankInc(yi) iff RankInc(yi, t+ i)
Theorem 1. Every causation chain of an economic DPR
instance (∫$,∫t, G) is valley-free.
Proof: Assume not. Then there exists a causation chain
Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit and an index i such that 0 < i < k
and yi°1 ∫$ yi π$ yi+1. Thus yi°1 and yi+1 are peers or
providers to yi.
The first part of this proof shows that if this is the case, then
at no time during the causation chain did yi have a customer
path. The second part of this proof shows that sometime during
the causation chain yi+1 had a path through yi. Therefore yi+1
had a realized valley path since yi did not have a customer
path and yi is a customer of or peer to yi+1. Since valley-
paths are forbidden in economic DPR instances, this results in
a contradiction. Since C(yi) = yi°1, either the first or second
condition of causation from Table I holds for yi at time t+ i.
Case: yi Causation Condition 1
If the first condition of Table I holds for yi then: Ω(yi) =
yi°1 and RankDec(yi), as shown in Figure 13. Therefore
º(yi) ¬t+i ºnext(yi). Let v = Ωnext(yi). It cannot be that
v ¡$ yi. Otherwise, since ºnext(yi) is a customer path and
º(yi) is not a customer path (since Ω(yi) = yi°1 ∫$ yi), by the
conditions of economic DPR instances: º(yi) ¡t+i ºnext(yi),
causing a contradiction as shown in Figure 14. Thus v ∫$ yi
and Ωnext(yi) ∫$ yi.
root
yi-1
t+i
v
yi yi+1
root
yi-1
t+i+1
v
yi yi+1
Fig. 13. Causation condition 1: RankDec(yi)
root
yi-1
t+i+1
v
yi yi+1
root
yi-1
t+i
v
yi yi+1
Fig. 14. Contradiction: RankInc(yi)
Case: yi Causation Condition 2
If the second condition of Table I holds for yi then:
Ωnext(yi) = yi°1 and RankInc(yi), as shown in Figure 15.
Therefore º(yi) ¡t+i ºnext(yi). Let v = Ω(yi). It cannot
be that v ¡$ yi. Otherwise, since º(yi) is a customer
path and ºnext(yi) is not (since Ωnext(yi) = yi°1 ∫$ yi),
by the conditions of economic DPR instances º(yi) ¬t+i
ºnext(yi), causing a contradiction, as shown in Figure 16. Thus
Ωnext(yi) ∫$ yi and v ∫$ yi. So for both cases, at no time in
the causation chain did yi have a customer path:
Ω(yi) ∫$ yi and Ωnext(yi) ∫$ yi
root
yi-1
t+i
v
yi yi+1
root
yi-1
t+i+1
v
yi yi+1
Fig. 15. Causation condition 2: RankInc(yi)
root
yi-1
t+i+1
v
yi yi+1
root
yi-1
t+i
v
yi yi+1
Fig. 16. Contradiction: RankDec(yi)
Case: yi+1 Causation Condition 1
If the first causation condition of Table I holds for yi+1,
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then Ω(yi+1) = yi. By Proposition 1: º(yi+1) = hyi+1 º(yi)i.
º(yi+1) is a valley path since yi+1 ∫$ yi π$ Ω(yi). Since
all valley paths are forbidden, º(yi+1) can never be realized,
causing a contradiction.
Case: yi+1 Causation Condition 2
Similar arguments can be used if the second causation
condition of Table I holds for yi+1: Ωnext(yi+1) = yi. Thus
by Proposition 1: ºnext(yi+1) = hyi+1 ºnext(yi)i. ºnext(yi+1)
is a valley path since yi+1 ∫$ yi π$ Ωnext(yi), and can never
be realized. Thus in all cases a contradiction occurs, proving
the theorem.
APPENDIX B
THEOREMS AND PROOFS FOR VIOLATION 1
Violation 1 involves the most complicated constructions.
The following subsection formally defines non-strict economic
relationships. If an economic DPR has non-strict economic
relationships D = (∫§,∫, G), then it contains the economic
operator ∫§. From ∫§, a tight economic relation is defined
by:
u ¬§ v iff u ∫§ v and u  § v
and no relation is defined by:
uk§v iff u ✏§ v and u  § v
The customer, peer, and provider economic relationships can
be derived from the operator ∫§:
• If u is a customer of v, then u ¡§ v.
• If u is a provider to v, then u ¬§ v.
• If u is a peer to v, then uk§v.
The transitive properties of the economic operator ∫§ can be
modeled using post-order conditions:
1) (reflexive) x ∫§ x
2) (anti-symmetric) x ∫§ y and y ∫§ x implies x = y
3) (transitive) x ∫§ y and y ∫§ z implies x ∫§ z
The key difference between a strict and non-strict economic
operator is that peering relationships are not transitive in the
non-strict variant. Whereas peering is represented by the equiv-
alence relation =$ in the strict variant, peering is represented
by no relation k§ in the non-strict variant. Thus as shown
in figure 17, strict economic relationships form equivalence
classes with the peering relation =$, which are not present
in standard economic relationships. This enables a node to
be both an indirect peer and provider to another node in the
standard variant. However it should be noted that provider-to-
customer relationships are transitive in both variants.
For ease of notation, the following notation is used to
describe that node x is a peer or provider to node y:
x v§ y iff x ⌃§ y
We define paths by the economic relationship between a path’s
starting node u and its next-hop. For all paths Pu:
Customer(Pu) , u ¬§ NextHop(Pu)
Peer(Pu) , uk§ NextHop(Pu)
Provider(Pu) , u ¡§ NextHop(Pu)
Strict Non-Strict
Fig. 17. Strict and Non-Strict economic relationships. The circles over the
nodes in the strict variant represent equivalent classes of peers.
Given a sequence of nodes ha b ci, valley types are represented
as follows:
Valley Type Condition Illustration
A a ¬§ b ¡§ c
B a ¬§ bk§c
C ak§b ¡§ c
D ak§bk§c
Theorem 3. All causation chains of non-strict economic DPR
instances are valley-free.
Proof: The proof follows exactly as the proof for theorem
1, only by replacing the ¬$ with ¬§ and ∫$ with v§.
Theorem 4. All causation cycles of non-strict economic DPR
instances are vertical and simple.
Proof: Let Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit be a causation cycle,
where y0 = yk. The cases for this proof can be partitioned
by y1’s economic relationship with y0:
Case (a): y0 ¬§ y1:
If y0 ¬§ y1, since Y is valley-free, yi ¬§ yi+1 for 0 ∑ i < k.
However y0 ¬§ yk = y0, causing a contradiction and
eliminating this case.
Case (b): y0k§y1:
If y0k§y1, since Y is valley-free, yi ¬§ yi+1 for 1 ∑ i < k.
Thus Y is vertical. Y has to be simple, otherwise hyk°1 y0 y1i
would be a realized causation chain. Since yk°1 ¬§ y0 and
y0k§y1, the causation chain is a valley, causing a contradiction.
Therefore Y is simple and vertical.
Case (c): y0 ¡§ y1:
Assume y0 ¡§ y1. Thus Y is vertical. The cases can be
further partitioned by yk°1’s economic relationship with yk.
If yk°1 ¡§ yk, then by the definition of valley-free sequences,
yi°1 ¡§ yi for all 0 < i ∑ k. Thus y0 ¡§ yk = y0, which is
a contradiction. Therefore yk°1 v§ yk. If Y is non-simple,
then hyk°1 y0 y1i would be a realized causation chain of.
Since yk°1 v§ y0 = yk and y0 ¡§ y1, the causation chain is
a valley, causing a contradiction. Therefore Y is simple and
vertical.
Remark 1. Non-strict economic follows instances are safe.
This follows from the results of [5].
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APPENDIX C
THEOREMS AND PROOFS FOR VIOLATION 2
Theorem 5. Every causation chain in an economic DPR
instance with violation 2 does not admit valley types A, B
or C.
Proof: Assume not. Then there exists a causation chain
Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit and an index i such that 0 < i < k and
at least one of the two conditions hold:
(a) yi°1 ¬$ yi π$ yi+1
(b) yi°1 ∫$ yi ¡$ yi+1
Case (a): yi°1 ¬$ yi π$ yi+1
If case (a) holds, then it can be shown that both Ω(yi) ¬$
yi and Ωnext(yi) ¬$ yi. This can be seen by looking at the
causation conditions of yi. If causation condition 1 holds for
yi, then yi°1 = Ω(yi) and RankDec(yi). It cannot be the case
that Ωnext(yi) π$ yi, since this would imply that yi switched
from a provider path through yi°1 to a non-provider path,
since yi ¡$ Ω(yi) = yi°1 and yi ∫$ Ωnext(yi). This would
imply RankInc(yi), causing a contradiction. Thus Ω(yi) ¬$ yi
and Ωnext(yi) ¬$ yi. If causation condition 2 holds for yi, then
yi°1 = Ωnext(yi) and RankInc(yi). It cannot be the case that
Ω(yi) π$ yi, since this would imply that yi switched from
a non-provider path to a provider path through yi°1, since
yi ∫$ Ω(yi) and yi ¡$ Ωnext(yi) = yi°1. This would imply
RankDec(yi), causing a contradiction. Thus for both cases,
Ω(yi) ¬$ yi and Ωnext(yi) ¬$ yi.
Thus given the results above, we can prove that yi+1 had a
realized path with valley type A or C. If causation condition 1
holds for yi+1, then º(yi+1) = hyi+1 º(yi)i. Since yi+1 ∫$ yi
and yi ¡$ Ω(yi), then º(yi+1) is a realized path with valley
type A or C, causing a contradiction. If causation condition
2 holds for yi+1, then ºnext(yi+1) = hyi+1 ºnext(yi)i. Since
yi+1 ∫$ yi and yi ¡$ Ωnext(yi), then ºnext(yi+1) is a realized
path with valley type A or C, causing a contradiction.
Case (b): yi°1 ∫$ yi ¡$ yi+1
If case (b) holds, then using an argument similar to case (a)
it can be shown that both Ω(yi) ∫$ yi and Ωnext(yi) ∫$ yi. We
can then prove that yi+1 had a realized path with valley type
A or B, causing a contradiction.
Theorem 6. Every vertical causation cycle Y = hy0 . . . ykit
in an economic DPR instance with violation 2 is simple.
Proof: This proof proceeds by determining y1’s economic
relationship with y0 and yk°1’s economic relationship with
yk = y0. Since Y is a vertical causation cycle, there exists a
minimal index i, 0 < i < k such that yi 6=$ yi°1. Note that
i 6= k, otherwise y0 =$ y1 =$ . . . =$ yk°1 6=$ yk, implying
y0 6=$ yk, which is a contradiction. Either yi ¬$ yi°1 or
yi ¡$ yi°1. It cannot be that yi°1 ¬$ yi, since by Theorem 5
y0 =$ yi°1 ¬$ yi ¬$ yi+1 . . . ¬$ yk, implying y0 ¬$ yk
which is a contradiction. Therefore yi°1 ¡$ yi. If i > 1, then
yi°2 =$ yi°1 ¡$ yi, representing a valley of type C, which is
a contradiction. So i = 1 and y0 ¡$ y1.
Let j be the first index 1 < j < k where yj°1 ¬$ yj .
Note that j has to exist otherwise y0 ¡$ y1 π$ . . . π$ yk,
implying y0 ¡$ yk which is a contradiction. From Theorem 5,
yh°1 ¬$ yh for all j < h ∑ k. So yk°1 ¬$ yk = y0. Therefore
Y must be simple, otherwise hyk°1 y0 y1i must be a causation
chain. However since yk°1 ¬$ y0 and y0 ¡$ y1, Y contains a
valley of type A, contradicting Theorem 5, and thus proving
the theorem.
Theorem 7. An economic DPR instance with violation 2
admits simple and non-simple horizontal causation cycles.
Proof: From the example shown in Figure 18 which is
identical to the “Bad Gadget” described in [4].
Theorem 8. An economic DPR instance with violation 2 is
potentially unsafe.
Proof: From the example shown in Figure 18, no stable
assignment exists.
Path preferences:
Node a: ha b rooti
ha rooti
Node b: hb c rooti
hb rooti
Node c: hc a rooti
hc rooti
Peer
root
c
a b
Peer
Peer Peer
Peer Peer
Fig. 18. Non-simple horizontal cycle for an economic DPR instance with
violation 2. Paths not listed in the path preferences are forbidden.
APPENDIX D
THEOREMS AND PROOFS FOR VIOLATION 3
Theorem 9. Every causation chain in an economic DPR
instance with violation 3 does not admit valley types A or
B.
Proof: Assume not. Then there exists a causation chain
Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit and an index i such that 0 < i < k and
yi°1 ¬$ yi π$ yi+1. The same reasoning as case (a) from the
proof of Theorem 5 can be used. By considering the causation
conditions of yi, it can be shown that both Ω(yi) ¬$ yi and
Ωnext(yi) ¬$ yi. We can then prove that yi+1 had a realized
path with valley type A or B, causing a contradiction..
Path preferences:
Node a: ha b rooti
ha rooti
Node b: hb c rooti
hb rooti
Node c: hc a rooti
hc rooti
Peer
root
c
a b
Provider
Provider Provider
Peer Peer
Fig. 19. Non-simple horizontal cycle for an economic DPR instance with
violation 3. Paths not listed in the path preferences are forbidden.
Theorem 10. Every vertical causation cycle in an economic
DPR instance with violation 3 is simple.
Proof: Assume not. Let vertical causation cycle Y =
hy0 y1 . . . ykit be non-simple. Since Y is a vertical causation
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cycle, there exists a minimal index i, 0 < i < k such that
yi 6=$ yi°1. Following a similar argument as the one used to
prove Theorem 6 we can prove that Y contains a valley of
type A or B, which is a contradiction.
Theorem 11. An economic DPR instance with violation 3
admits simple and non-simple horizontal causation cycles.
Proof: From the example shown in Figure 19. This
example is identical to the “Bad Gadget” described in [4].
Theorem 12. An economic DPR instance with violation 3 is
potentially unsafe.
Proof: From the example shown in Figure 19, no stable
assignment exists.
APPENDIX E
THEOREMS AND PROOFS FOR VIOLATION 4
Theorem 13. Every causation chain in an economic DPR
instance with violation 4 does not admit valley types C or D.
Proof: Assume not. Then there exists a causation chain
Y = hy0 y1 . . . ykit and an index i such that 0 < i < k and:
yi°1 =$ yi π$ yi+1
The rest of the proof follows similarly to that of theorem 5.
First it is shown that both Ω(yi) ∫$ yi and Ωnext(yi) ∫$ yi.
Then it is shown that either Ω(yi+1) or Ωnext(yi+1) is a valley
path, causing a contradiction.
Theorem 14. There are no horizontal cycles in economic DPR
instances with violation 4.
Proof: This follows directly from theorem 13, which
states that causation chains of type D do not exist.
Theorem 15. An economic DPR instance with violation 4
admits simple and non-simple vertical causation cycles.
Proof: From the example shown in Figure 20. This
example is identical to the “Bad Gadget” described in [4].
Path preferences:
Node a: ha b rooti
ha rooti
Node b: hb c rooti
hb rooti
Node c: hc a rooti
hc rooti
Fig. 20. Non-simple horizontal cycle for an economic DPR instance with
violation 4. All edges are customer/provider links. Paths not listed in the path
preferences are forbidden.
Theorem 16. An economic DPR instance with violation 4 is
potentially unsafe.
Proof: From the example shown in Figure 20, no stable
assignment exists.
u vxuvM xuvM-1 xuv2
, (u, v)t 2 E
. . . .u
vxuvM xuvM-1 xuv2
, (u, v)t 62 E
Fig. 21. Transit Nodes
APPENDIX F
ASYNCHRONICITY WITH DPR
This section describes how the DPR model can simulate
asynchronicity. We assume that we have a regular DPR in-
stance D = (∫, G) which we wish to augment with asyn-
chronicity. There are several ways to represent asynchronicity.
We will use link delays. This choice enables us to use the
existing DPR model without adding new constructs. At any
time t, each link (u, v)t 2 E admits a variable time delay
between 1 and a finite upper limit M .
This delay is specified by the function L(u, v, t) which
outputs an integer in [1,M ]. The time delays are considered
ordered, such that L(u, v, t) ° L(u, v, t + k) < k. Thus the
values L(u, v, 4) = 100 and L(u, v, 5) = 2 are not allowed
since v would get u’s path at time 5 before receiving u’s path
at time 4. From DPR instance D and delay function L, a new
DPR instance D0 = (∫0, G0) can be constructed to simulate
D with the time delays.
For every pair of nodes in the original instance D, a set
of M ° 1 transit nodes will be added to D0. These transit
nodes represent the “communication wire” between every two
nodes. The dynamic nature of the links in DPR instances will
be used to control the length of the “communication wire”.
If L(u, v, t) = 5, then a path of length 5 between u and v
through the transit nodes will appear at time t.
A. Graph of Asynchronous DPR Instances
For every node u in the original DPR instance D, there is
a corresponding node in the asynchronous DPR instance D0:
u 2 V ) u 2 V 0
For every two nodes u, v in D, there are M °1 transit nodes:
u, v 2 V ) xuvi 2 V 0 for 2 ∑ i ∑M
Each transit node is connected to its neighbors. This connec-
tion forms the longest possible communication between nodes
u and v. It toggles on/off with the connectivity of (u, v)t 2 E
for each time t, as shown in figure 21.8<: (u, x
uv
M )t 2 E0
(xuvi+1, xuvi ) 2 E0 for all 1 < i < M
(xuv2 , v)t 2 E0
9=; iff (u, v)t 2 E
The time delays L(u, v, t) describe the “shortcut” available
through the transit nodes at each time t:
(u, xuvi )
t 2 E0 iff (u, v)t 2 E and L(u, v, t) = i
(u, v)t 2 E0 iff (u, v)t 2 E and L(u, v, t) = 1
An example of a delay of one and three between nodes u
and v can be seen in figures 22 and 23.
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u vxuvM xuvM-1 xuv2xuv3
Fig. 22. Transit nodes simulating a delay of L(u, v, t) = 1.
u vxuvM xuvM-1 xuv2xuv3
Fig. 23. Transit nodes simulating a delay of L(u, v, t) = 3.
B. Path Preferences of Asynchronous DPR Instances
The path preferences of the asynchronous DPR: D0 = (∫0
, G0) discount the presence of transit nodes in paths. Let
the operation RemoveTransit remove all transit nodes of a
sequence. This operation allows us to derive the asynchronous
path preferences from the original synchronous path prefer-
ences. Thus for all non-transit nodes u 2 V 0:
Pu1 ∫0tPu2 iff RemoveTransit(Pu1 ) ∫t RemoveTransit(Pu2 )
Each transit node xuvi prefers a path through its source node
u than through its transit neighbor toward the source: xuvi+1.
Paths containing sequences in the opposite direction of the
“communication link” (from xuvi to xuvi°1) are forbidden.
C. Redundant Connections
The transformation from synchronous to asynchronous DPR
instances described above needs to be enhanced to avoid
transient routing losses. This can occur during abrupt changes
in connection delays as shown in figure 24.
In order to remedy this situation, redundant links between
the source node u and the transit nodes are established, as
shown in figure 25. This enables path consistency during
changes of communication delays. Thus the proper transfor-
mation of links from synchronous D to asynchronous D0 can
be represented as:
(u, xuvi )
t 2 E0 iff (u, v)t 2 E and L(u, v, t) ∑ i
(u, v)t 2 E0 iff (u, v)t 2 E and L(u, v, t) = 1
D. Causation Chains in Asynchronous DPR Instances
The definition of causation chains is not changed for
asynchronous DPR instances. Given delay L(u, v, t) = 3, a
causation chain of hu vit in the original DPR instance D
would correspond to a causation chain of hu xuv3 xuv2 vit in
the asynchronous DPR instance D0.
Graph Node Path
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=0
u hu rooti
xuv3 hi
xuv2 hi
v hi
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=1
u hu rooti
xuv3 hxuv3 u rooti
xuv2 hi
v hv u rooti
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=2
u hu rooti
xuv3 hxuv3 u rooti
xuv2 hxuv2 xuv3 u rooti
v hi
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=3
u hu rooti
xuv3 hxuv3 u rooti
xuv2 hxuv2 xuv3 u rooti
v hv xuv2 xuv3 u rooti
Fig. 24. Node v has a transient path loss from node u. This is due to an
increase in delay from L(u, v, 0) = 1 to L(u, v, 1) = 3.
E. Asynchronous Economic DPR Instances
Asynchronous economic DPR instances can follow the
definitions described in Section IV. Transit nodes have no
economic relationships with the other nodes. The domain of
the economic operator ∫$ is only over non-transit nodes.
Characterization of sequences (causation chains or paths) is
accomplished by using the RemoveTransit operator. A path
P in D0 is valley-free if its corresponding transit-free path
RemoveTransit(P ) is valley-free. Similarly, a causation chain
Y in D0 is valley-free if its corresponding transit-free chain
RemoveTransit(Y ) is valley-free. Similar use of Remove-
Transit can be employed to characterize customer, peer, and
provider paths. From this construction, the proofs of this report
are unchanged except for the application of the RemoveTransit
operator.
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Graph Node Path
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=0
u hu rooti
xuv3 hi
xuv2 hi
v hi
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=1
u hu rooti
xuv3 hxuv3 u rooti
xuv2 hxuv2 u rooti
v hv u rooti
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=2
u hu rooti
xuv3 hxuv3 u rooti
xuv2 hxuv2 xuv3 u rooti
v hv xuv2 u rooti
u vxuv2xuv3
root
t=3
u hu rooti
xuv3 hxuv3 u rooti
xuv2 hxuv2 xuv3 u rooti
v hv xuv2 xuv3 u rooti
Fig. 25. An increase in connection delay occured from L(u, v, 0) = 1 to
L(u, v, 1) = 3. Transient path loss at node v is prevented due to redundant
connections.
